Gordon Research Conference
- Nuclear Waste and Energy By PETE
V. DOMENICI
United States Senator
August 6, 1998
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PETE V. DOMENICI
United States SenatorI want to thank the Gordon Research Conference
for scheduling this program dedicated to Nuclear Waste and Energy. The subject matter and
timing match very well with my interest in sparking a national dialogue on nuclear
technology issues. I called for this dialogue in an October 1997 speech at Harvard. My
goal in this national dialogue is to ensure that the benefits of nuclear technologies
remain available for our citizens.
I’ve
had an interesting nine months since that speech, with hundreds of compliments and
suggestions coming in. There has been real progress since that speech, but immense tasks
lie ahead. After all, it’s taken us decades to get into the current situation
regarding nuclear technologies, and there are no simple "silver bullets" to move
us quickly ahead.
I
had an unusual opportunity on this Fourth of July to deliver a keynote speech in Obninsk,
Russia, at a conference on Youth and the Plutonium Challenge. I used that opportunity to
reflect on the interplay between global risks associated with nuclear technologies and the
future opportunities for nuclear energy. I discussed risks associated with nuclear weapons
and their deliberate or accidental use; proliferation of nuclear materials, expertise, and
weapons; and high-level nuclear waste. Failure to address these risks will limit our
ability to realize the benefits of nuclear energy.
In
my comments today, I want to briefly discuss these risks along with some of the concrete
actions that I’ve taken to create funded programs to address some of them. I also
want to share information that I obtained during that recent trip to France, Russia and
Germany and invite your help in shaping future initiatives.
Nuclear Weapons
Consider
the first risk — nuclear weapons. We and Russia have far too many weapons. To date,
we haven't had the level of trust between us to reduce stockpiles to low levels. That
forces us to put resources into responding to a potential Russian threat, instead of a
wiser course of dedicating more resources to help Russia reduce the threat they could
present to us.
Weapons
dismantlement is one of my high priorities, but that dismantlement must be accomplished so
as to preserve parity between the two nations and enhance trust. Furthermore, as we
dismantle nuclear weapons, I want to move ahead with disposition of the weapons-grade
plutonium. I don’t think our Administration has fully appreciated the opportunity
that exists to permanently reduce the threat posed by inventories of weapons-grade
plutonium in Russia. Both nations must rapidly convert weapons components to less
dangerous forms, place these unclassified forms under international safeguards and move
towards disposition as MOX fuel in civilian reactors. We are moving far too slowly in
these efforts. To date, we don’t even have a bilateral agreement in place
establishing rates for each of these steps along with carefully developed transparency
measures. This puts us in the position of developing a unilateral program only for for
disposition of our own weapons-surplus plutonium, which would be a strong concern in
Congress.
I
strongly favor disposition through MOX as opposed to the immobilization route in the
Administration’s dual track approach. It attains far greater certainty that materials
will not be reused in weapons. In Russia, we discussed their interest in MOX. It was
evident that immobilization is viewed with great suspicion in Russia, while they accept
MOX as a credible disposition approach. We also heard no enthusiasm for rapid use of their
weapons-grade plutonium in MOX, along with strong interest in storing much of it until
future generations of fast reactors can optimally use the fuel. Plutonium is clearly
viewed as a Russian national asset.
Both
countries have declared 50 tons of weapons-grade plutonium as surplus. But as MOX programs
are discussed, I've been very critical of the planned rates for MOX use that are far too
low to quickly reduce the threat that the Russian 50 tons of material may be diverted to
rogue nations or that weapons may be rebuilt. The U.S. plan couples our weapons
dismantlement rate directly to our MOX use rate, both at 3.5 tons per year. In Russia,
current plans call for a rate of only 1.3 tons per year. Instead, I’ve argued that we
need to set a goal for the annual disposition rate in each country of at least 10 metric
tons. This high rate would enable a program duration for this 50 tons that may be
consistent with the length of the current window of opportunity. We certainly can not
afford to wait for progress in a program moving at 1.3 tons per year!
Earlier
this year, I suggested using European capabilities for fabrication of MOX and
MOX-qualified reactors around the world to accept the MOX fuel. I hoped to use this route
to achieve a 10 ton per year rate for the entire disposition process. I explored this
approach carefully in France, and found little interest in using weapons-based MOX in
French reactors. In addition, most of their MOX fabrication capacity is subscribed now. I
heard concerns in France that such steps would disrupt their plans to recycle their
reactor-grade plutonium and would introduce weapons-grade plutonium into their commercial
systems.
For
that reason, I came back from France favoring a plan wherein we achieve the 10 ton per
year goal in the dismantlement, conversion, and storage steps, but not in the MOX steps.
We still need to view the overall program from dismantlement through MOX as an integrated
program -- we do not want to declare victory when the material is in the storage phase.
On
this same trip, I became convinced that we need a far higher level of attention within the
Administration to the issues surrounding disposition of weapons-grade plutonium. For that
reason, I’ve strongly recommended to the President that he appoint a special envoy
focused on this issue. That envoy should be able to coordinate the multiple federal
agencies that must contribute to this program, as well as appropriately involve the G-7
nations in the solution.
Rapid
reductions in stocks of weapons-grade plutonium in each country are a necessary step
towards my strong interest in sizing stockpiles to meet only realistic estimates of
possible threats; in the nearer term, I want strong arms control agreements that count
actual weapons, both tactical and strategic. We can’t develop such agreements as long
as Russia has both large quantities of weapons materials and a tremendous capability to
rapidly rebuild nuclear weapons.
Proliferation
Let
me turn to the second risk area that impedes increased use of nuclear energy—
proliferation. Proliferation of all kinds - of weapons, weapons materials, and weapons
expertise - is another challenge of vital importance. In fact, this might be the greatest
immediate threat to global stability that we now face. My interest in moving quickly on
disposition of weapons-grade plutonium obviously addresses this risk.
India
and Pakistan have certainly demonstrated that other nations have the technical ability to
develop nuclear weapons. Only the difficulty of getting nuclear materials stops more
countries from moving down this path.
On
our trip in Russia, we discussed with Minister Adamov that many Russian export activities
fuel suspicions in the United States that they are encouraging proliferation. The Russian
leadership was firm in their statements that they are sensitive to proliferation concerns.
But as long as they are actively working with nations like Iran and Syria, to say nothing
of agreeing to provide two new reactors to India right after their nuclear tests, their
assurances are not well received in the U.S. We did discuss with Minister Adamov some
concrete actions, like a commission to re-evaluate the Non-Proliferation Treaty
constraints, that might help this situation.
In
Russia, we devoted considerable time to exploring their progress with joint, cooperative
programs for Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting. These are excellent efforts,
that only need to be reinforced. Risks, like fresh and spent fuel for their nuclear Navy,
represent areas seriously in need of improved controls.
Another
type of proliferation involves "brain-drain" issues, potential migration of
Russian scientists trained in weapons of mass destruction. There are a few programs that
address this challenge now, like the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, but they
are not making enough progress. In Russia, we discussed the new Nuclear Cities Initiative
with the goal of diversifying the economies of these closed cities. There is now $30M in
the Senate’s FY99 budget for this. At the moment, there are some ideas on how this
Initiative should advance, but these ideas aren’t well formed yet. My visit to
Arzamas only confirmed that the Initiative has an immense challenge, first just to
overcome the isolation and security issues with these cities, to say nothing of the
Russian tax system. Nevertheless, this Initiative is very important; it needs innovative
ideas to be successful.
Waste
A
third risk involves management of defense wastes generated during the Cold War. There are
real risks associated with these wastes, in both our countries. In some sense, these
wastes represent the "battlefield" from our Cold War. Now they must be cleaned
up. We are really struggling with this in the United States, and we are not doing a good
job so far. We are continuing to pump large amounts of funding into this effort, but I
worry whether we are really getting the type of progress we need. There are many local
agreements for specific milestones plus interests for employment security at each site
that make it very difficult to use risk-based prioritization in our cleanup efforts. Our
progress in low or high level civilian waste programs is equally abysmal.
A
major hurdle in these programs involves the radiation dose standards for cleanup of
defense or former reactor sites that are far below variations in natural background rates.
As you know, these standards are driven by the linear no-threshold model for radiation
risk. There are many indications that this model seriously over-estimates risks. These
same risk uncertainties also play directly into discussions of nuclear energy whenever
transportation or long term spent fuel management strategies are discussed. Computations
based on the LNT model are routinely used to frighten the public.
I
feel very strongly that we need the best possible standards for radiation risks, based on
the best science we can produce. We put $20M into next year’s Senate budget to study
the effects of low-levels of radiation on health. Through this research we need to
determine, based on knowledge instead of extrapolation, our low-dose radiation standards.
Nuclear Energy
Finally,
let me turn to the future of civilian nuclear energy. I've decided to focus significant
attention on nuclear energy because I feel strongly that we must ensure that we and future
generation have clean, reliable, safe energy supplies. There are excellent arguments in
favor of nuclear energy from economic, environmental, and national security perspectives.
Yet, nuclear energy is burdened with the risk areas I’ve discussed, along with an
ample set of its own challenges.
Over
these past months, I’ve become sensitive to the importance of discussing nuclear
energy from the perspective of its broad benefits. Much of the anti-nuclear energy
rhetoric focuses exclusively on risks, often with exaggerated consequences. One example of
the misinformation used by such campaigns would be the "mobile Chernobyl" tag
applied to transportation of spent fuel. I’ve also been concerned that no
environmental groups have stepped forward to endorse nuclear energy as our best near term
solution to meet their own concerns on emissions related to electrical generation. I
don’t see how we can come close to the Administrations goals for reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions without nuclear power.
Some
of the anti-nuclear groups seek to pit nuclear energy against renewable energy sources,
which I find unfortunate. I frequently hear from advocates of these sources that they can
fulfill the nation’s future energy needs. I’ve supported robust research
programs for renewables, but I still see them as a long ways from providing cost effective
solutions that could really replace nuclear energy. That may change in time. But for now
nuclear energy must be a key part of our national energy strategy.
The
most serious near-term barrier to nuclear energy evaluations involves our failure to deal
with high level waste. We chose in 1982 to freeze our options and focus only on permanent
storage in Yucca Mountain. After collecting close to $14 Billion from ratepayers, we are
still a long way from a permanent repository. As spent fuel fills storage pools across the
country, the level of public concern with it grows; plus some utilities are simply running
out of storage space.
I
think France chose a better path, when in 1991 they set up a 15 year study period to
examine alternative strategies for spent fuel. The French also sought to minimize the
environmental risks at each step in their closed fuel cycle. The French reprocessing
system provides reduced volume and radiotoxicity of their wastes relative to our spent
fuel. After studying the French closed cycle, I’m interested in seeing research on
closed cycle options here as well.
One
strong lesson from France is that they treat interim storage as a necessary and simple
step. Here we have been embroiled in a tremendous political debate about interim storage,
with the Administration blocking any possible movement. I’m personally convinced that
we need to use interim storage to move spent fuel from the many storage sites across the
country. Once we have that interim storage, we may decide to proceed with the permanent
repository, but interim storage would give us time to explore whether other spent fuel
policies might be more appropriate in the future. Some type of reprocessing of our spent
fuel, or future reuse of the residual energy in that fuel, may be in our best interests
some decades into the future.
As
part of my evaluations of nuclear energy, I held one hearing on advanced reactors and fuel
cycle options. I’m very interested in new reactor designs that demonstrate key
characteristics: they must be very safe, burn fuel efficiently, create minimum waste, and
exhibit excellent proliferation resistance. Obviously too, they have to be economically
sound, if not today, then measured against future energy options.
After
this hearing, the Senate has now identified funding for one of these new reactor concepts,
the Modular Helium Reactor, to continue its major international collaborations. In
addition, the Accelerator Transmutation of Waste research program was funded to explore
improved spent fuel strategies. In Russia, we heard interest in both these programs, as
well as in fast liquid metal-cooled systems, both those with sodium and those lead-bismuth
coolants.
There
are other new initiatives in the Senate’s budget for FY99 as well. The Senate funded
the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, NERI, for $24M, for peer-reviewed nuclear science
and engineering research. The Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization program for studies
focused on life extension and license renewal of existing reactors is funded at $10M. In
addition, we funded a $10M initiative for University Reactor fuel assistance and to slow
the decline of graduates from U.S. nuclear science and engineering programs.
In
addition to research programs, I’ve also led inquiries into the performance of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Frankly, the NRC has for too long existed without the
appropriate amount of Congressional oversight. We have allowed its influence to expand --
especially in light of the fact that no other agency has been a proponent of nuclear
power. I’m concerned that too many NRC directives are not promoting safe operations,
and certainly are not using risk-informed criteria. While many of the NRC requirements
have questionable impact on safety, their impact on the price of nuclear energy is far
more obvious. These concerns also inject uncertainty into the future climate for nuclear
energy in the country. The first hearing to review the NRC was on July 30, and the second
hearing is set on January 28, 1999. These NRC hearings will hopefully stimulate
streamlining the Commission with a sharper focus on real safety issues.
Next Steps
I’ve
discussed with you some of the new programs that are now approved by the Senate. These
programs will start to address some of the shortcomings in our current national policies
surrounding nuclear technologies. But I’m very open to consideration of new
approaches and initiatives that might be undertaken in the next few years. Your Conference
may help define what some of those forward steps might entail.
Some example of new initiatives might involve areas like:
• Disposition of weapons-grade surplus plutonium must proceed rapidly in
Russia. Appropriate bilateral agreements must be in place that provide both assurance on
rates and adequate transparency.
• Further improvements in the composition or focus of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission. As a minimum, predictability in licensing times and in consequences for NRC
concerns is essential.
• Interim storage must move ahead, although the legislative path is clouded
due to the Administration’s strong objections.
• Approaches to encourage appreciation of the environmental benefits of
nuclear energy. We need public recognition that nuclear energy is the best short-term
option to reduce emissions from electrical generation.
• Approaches to move more rapidly towards understanding low dose radiation
risks,
• Approaches to accomplish more progress on cleanup of nuclear legacy wastes
in the U.S.,
• Improvements in the Nuclear Cities Initiative to move the Russian closed
cities more rapidly toward diversified economies,
• Public education initiatives. This education might focus on treatment of
different energy sources through careful discussion of their full suite of life- cycle
benefits, impacts, and risks. We need a well informed public to understand and respond to
misleading slogans from the anti-nuclear groups like "mobile Chernobyls!"
• A shift in legislative focus to encompass renewable energy sources within a
broader definition of zero emission energy sources, along with encouragement for progress
toward increased use of zero emission sources.
I’m
convinced that we have an historic opportunity in the next few years to change the way
nuclear matters are viewed in the United States. I am going to do all I can to seize this
opportunity. My ultimate goal is that in the year 2045, 100 years after the detonation of
the first atomic bomb and the birth of the nuclear age, the world will evaluate the role
played by nuclear technologies and conclude that their overall impact was strongly
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